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ABSTRACT
The theme of Islam-West relations in this paper explores several findings from academic studies, utilizing a literary study approach aimed at elucidating the 'roots' of conflict and the factors influencing the occurrence of conflict in Islam-West relations. Findings from an in-depth analysis of several current literatures describe the historicity and the impact analysis of the Crusades as the root of the issues underlying the confrontation and clash (conflict) in Islam-West relations. Furthermore, the most influential factors in shaping Western stereotypes of Islam are attributed to misunderstandings in the application of the 'sacred concept' of democracy and the interpretation of the 'evil doctrine' of Jihad, as well as the mention of 'soft terrorism' regarding the Muslim migration process to Europe. Subsequently, it presents several criticisms, rebuttals, refinements, and rejections of the clash of civilizations thesis. Finally, it prepares a conceptual framework regarding Indonesia’s strategic position and role as the world’s largest Muslim democracy in the context of issues related to Islam-West relations.

INTRODUCTION
The dynamics of the relationship between the Western world and Islam, as viewed by Azyumardi Azra (2019), are described as ‘not yet improving.’ This assertion is based on the findings of a 2006 Pew Research Institute survey, which depicted that the relationship between the Muslim world and the West has not shown significant signs of improvement; the relationship between the two sides remains poor, characterized by mutual misperceptions and prejudices. However, it is important to note that although the relationship between the two sides remains ‘bad,’ it is clearly not worsening, as there have been no extraordinary international events in the past year that have led to increased hostility between the two sides. Therefore, in my opinion, the opportunity for both sides to improve relations still remains open.

The lack of improvement in Islam-West relations, in line with John L. Esposito’s explanation (1992), states that based on historical facts, although Islam and the West share the same theological roots and have interacted for centuries, their relationship is often marked by ignorance, mutual stereotyping, insults, and conflict. Both parties focus solely on sharpening differences and polarization, rather than uniting the visions of the three major monotheistic traditions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) that are interrelated. This condition has led to the resurgence of the dichotomy between Islam and the West in modern times, as viewed by Gema Martti Munoz (2010), as a result of perceptions arising from the post-Cold War division of the world into East and West. In their search for a new adversary since the late
1980s, the West has chosen to oppose Islam by rekindling cultural issues as triggers for conflict. Similarly, Mohammed Abed al-Jabri (2010) in his work titled "Clash of Civilizations: Future Relations?" asserts that a 'logic of war' has been constructed since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, with Western analysts still questioning the issue: after communism, who would be the West's enemy? This is almost like the end of a war, in the case of the Cold War, which only unleashes another or, in a philosophical sense, as if the Western ego asserts itself by negating others. Before examining the epistemological basis of such attitudes, the main theses of those who understand the future relationship between Islam and the West in this way are first briefly reviewed.

According to Esposito, what dominates the contemporary image of Islam and the West is the influence of Political Islam or, more commonly known as 'Islamic Fundamentalism'. He argues that in the post-Cold War period, the relationship between the Muslim world and the West has been further influenced by the resurgence of Islam and their views in government and media that highlight the spectrum of religious, political, cultural, and demographic threats posed by Islamic fundamentalism or an impending clash of civilizations. We still live in a world that continues to discuss or see headlines—Militant Islam, Islamic resurgence, Islamic fanaticism, Islamic guerrillas, and Islamic terrorism. This hysteria creates an atmosphere where the wearing of headscarves is not only seen as a threat by regimes in Tunisia but also by France.

Why does this happen? Munoz explains that it is related to the transformation experienced by the global system since the end of the bipolar system. Such a transformation affects the interpretation of security principles, with the weakening of the concept of ideological military threats of the past. However, this new situation eliminates attitudes that emphasize particularism and leads to social developments at the regional and local levels. When the strategic values applied by states in the previous order are changed, the domestic status quo of the state is challenged by its emergence, after years of oppression, socio-political, ethnic, and cultural movements with the assistance of great powers and their strategic assets. These movements now voice their concerns when they are in a process of globalization. Societies and nations are now dominated by a dialectic between universal integration and the affirmation of differences, in order for regimes whose survival depends more on their ability to generate legitimacy and institutional efficiency than on foreign support. In addition to understanding the ongoing changes in a socio-political and humanitarian context, these changes are utilized by certain regimes to support arguments by justifying the mismatch of civilizations.

Another possibility is the existence of a 'past glory syndrome', where Islam once reached the highest level in human history in the fields of art and civilization. As described by Bernard Lewis (2002) in his book "What Went Wrong? The Reasons for the Collapse of the Caliphate and the Decline of the Islamic Ummah," the Islamic world once led world civilization and achieved great achievements for centuries. In the view of Muslims themselves, Islam is synonymous with civilization, and outside of civilization, there are only barbarians and infidels. Such self-perception and perception of others were once held by almost all civilizations such as the Greeks, Romans, Indians, Chinese, and present-day nations. Furthermore, Lewis provides reasons why Muslims seem to only confront Christians, not other civilizations—Greeks, Romans, Indians, and Chinese—according to him, because Christianity holds a special position, namely as the only religion that competes with Islam to become a world religion and a world power. In the view of Muslims, Christianity is the religion that has been replaced by Islam as the last revealed religion, and its power has been replaced by the greater power of Islam directed by divine revelation.

The depiction of a confrontation between Islam and Christianity, in explaining the context of tension and conflict in Islam-West relations, can be found in the studies of several academic works (Orientalists) including William Montgomery Watt (1996), Charles Kimball (2013), Hugh Goddard (2013), and Graham E. Fuller (2014). Specifically, in Hugh Goddard’s (2013) book "A History of Encounter between Islam and Christianity: Points of Convergence and Disagreement of the Two Largest Religious Communities in the World," he argues that before the ninth/third century, there were three main models of Christian interpretations of Islam, namely Islam as the fulfillment of God’s promise to Abraham/Ishmael; Islam as God’s punishment on Christians who accepted the decisions of
the Council of Chalcedon; and Islam as Christian heresy. However, in the ninth century, several new, more negative interpretations of Islam emerged from within Christianity. In this framework, the relationship between Islam and the West can be termed as a ‘theological clash’, where each side has presented evaluations and built perceptions based on interpretations of their sacred texts. Although these scholars are very cautious in mentioning—not acknowledging—a religious/theological clash, it cannot be denied that tension and conflict in Islam-West relations have a religious dimension.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Tracking the Meeting Points and Points of Conflict between Islam and the West. Based on several main findings from the 2006 Pew Research Institute survey, it can be used as a frame of reference in analyzing the actual conditions of the ups and downs of relations between Islam and the West. This, as explained by Azra: First, anti-Jewish sentiment remains high in Muslim countries and within Muslims in Germany, England and Spain. But 71 percent of French Muslims have a positive view of Jews; secondly, the majority of Muslims stated that Hamas’ victory in Palestine would help a just settlement between Israel and Palestine. This opinion is firmly rejected by Westerners; third, the majority of Muslims in the recent case of the Prophet Muhammad cartoon controversy view the West as not respecting Islam. Meanwhile, the West responded to this as evidence of Muslim intolerance; fourth, the Spaniards and Germans—compared to other European societies—had a greater attitude of antagonism toward Muslims. In contrast, the majority of British and French people have a more positive view of Muslims; fifth, European Muslims—compared to Muslims of the Islamic World—are more likely to have a positive view of Europeans. And they also tend to see that the tension between the Muslim world and the West is not a ‘clash of civilizations.’

Relations between Islam and the West take place in a situation of ups and downs, and are often characterized by tension, friction and even conflict. The dynamics of relations between Islam and the West have long historical roots in the past of both civilizations. This condition has resulted in both parties being suspicious of each other and trying to monitor—spy—on each other. Islam accuses the West of never being able to understand Islam or learn its values (Values), so that the consequence is that it always brings their relationship in a location that is not conducive, in addition to causing their relationship to be trapped in high tension—emotions—. On the other hand, the West has accused Islam of being an exclusive and closed religion, even a religion that is prone to acts of violence, such as terrorism, extremism and fundamentalism. Although in Fuller’s view, frictions between religions and their followers are rarely based on specific theological differences, but rather by their political and social consequences.

To trace the stages of relations between Islam and the West, according to Sudibyo Markus, there is a common thread between the Crusades as the first milestone, which in the long term still created a “crusade syndrome” in the West, and the Second Vatican Council as a milestone The second is a “turning point” or “turning point” for the Catholic Church’s perspective on Islam to become more positive. Next to the open letter “A Common Word between Us and You” as the third milestone which is the answer to the “silent times” of the Islamic world after 400 years of crouching under the grip of Western colonialism, so to the final milestone “Agenda for Humanity” from the World Humanitarian Summit Istanbul which provides a structural framework for humanitarian cooperation and dialogue programs between the West and Islam.

This Crusade later became the starting point of contact and tension between Islamic and Western civilizations. Describing the encounter between Islam and the Christian West in history can be given two striking colors, namely ‘dark colors’ which include conflict, suspicion, hostility and even war. The second color is a ‘bright color’ which includes living together in a peaceful, trusting and enriching relationship. These two colors were born as a consequence of interactions that were unavoidable and consciously or unconsciously experienced by both parties. The Crusades were eight military expeditions that took place from the XI to the XIII centuries which pitted Christians (Franks’ Christian soldiers) against Islam (Saracen Muslim soldiers).
The XI century is marked as a decisive moment in relations between the West and the Islamic world. Western nations who emerged from the dark ages, launched attacks to expel Muslims from Spain, Italy, Sicily and the Mediterranean at the same time the Islamic world had experienced progress in political and religious struggles. The assumption that the Crusades were the initial momentum of conflict—confrontation—between Islam and the West was strengthened by the opinion of William Montgomery Watt (1996), who explained that one of the problems that shaped the conflict and tension between Islam and the West was the Crusades. The changing perception of the Crusades illustrates that the central issue regarding the Crusades is how the events themselves occurred and reflections on them in later centuries, influenced Islamic perceptions of Christianity.

Watt further explained that the best expression of a balanced contemporary Christian view of the Crusades can be found in the words of Sir Steven Runciman, in the conclusion of his third book on the history of the Crusades: The victory of the Crusaders was a victory of faith. But faith without wisdom is dangerous. History with legal laws is non-negotiable, the whole world must pay for the crimes and stupidity of all its citizens. In order to extend the interaction and fusion between East and West of our growing civilization, the Crusades were a tragic and destructive episode. Historians have looked back through the centuries at the tales of their valiant exploits, taking pride as opposed to suffering in testimonies that exposed the limits of human nature. So much courage and so little respect, so much loyalty and so little understanding. High and lofty ideals are tainted by cruelty and greed, courage and steadfastness are tainted by blindness and short-sighted self-righteousness. The holy war itself is no longer an intolerant movement in the name of God, which is an act of sin against the Holy Spirit.

On the contrary, according to Watt, contemporary Islamic perceptions of the Crusades are implicitly different from Christian perceptions. The majority of Muslims viewed the Crusades as nothing more than incidents of far-reaching Christian cruelty and cruelty, comparable to the British perception of events that occurred in northwestern British India in the nineteenth century. The caliphate in Baghdad is reported but not interesting, even though it did not have real political power at that time. The thieves who controlled the power of the outside world were the Seljuq dynasty, but their main centers were hundreds of miles east of Baghdad. If they had heard about the Crusades, they would have seen them as merely a variant of the form of strife that continued in this particular region during the latter half of the century. In turn it is important to state that Muslims now view the Crusades as the beginning of European colonialism. This view did not originate from Muslim historians in the past, but was the result of Muslims coming to the West as students and studying the writings of western historians. They noted that there were parallels between the Crusades and the colonialism they experienced in their home countries.

The extraordinary impact of the Crusades on relations between Islam and the West can be illustrated in Hugh Goddard’s review which states that the legacy of the Crusades can be seen in six different aspects: First, among Muslims, as we have seen, the Crusades left a legacy enduring suspicion of Western Christians. Second, all the series of Crusades also encouraged the rise of Islamic expansion. Third, paradoxically, the Crusades have confirmed the sentiment among Muslims that Jerusalem is the third Holy Place for Islam. Fourth, for Christians, the Crusades were responsible for the worsening position of Christians living under Muslim rule, because they were always suspected of being the next crusaders. Fifth, at the same time, the Crusades also paved the way for the involvement of the Western Church in the Middle East, as seen in the decision of the Maronite Church in Lebanon in 1180/576 to submit to papal authority in Rome. Sixth, the Crusades also contributed, to a certain extent, to the development of relations at various levels between the Islamic world and Western Europe.

From a political science perspective, contemporary dynamics are another root cause of the tension and conflict in relations between Islam and the West after the Crusades. According to Andrew Heywood (2015) tensions between Islam and the West can be traced back to British India in the nineteenth century, or even before that, the most important modern manifestation of which was the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which replaced the highly corrupt, but pro-Western with an 'Islamic Republic' under Ayatollah Khomeini. The Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-1989) at that time witnessed the growth of the Mujahideen, a loose group consisting of resistance groups driven by religious
motives, from which the Taliban grew and developed, which ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, and the al-Qaeda terrorist network, led by Osama bin Laden. Such groups typically portray their commitment to Islam as a jihad, a struggle, specifically aimed at expelling and eliminating Western influence, and especially the influence of the United States, and Israel (the ‘Judeo-Christian crusaders’), from the Muslim world. The September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda attacks on the United States, and the country’s response by launching a ‘war on terror’, not only made relations between Islam and the West even more important, but prompted many to interpret it as a conflict between civilizations.

RESEARCH METHOD
This paper constitutes a literature review utilizing a descriptive qualitative approach to examine Islam-West Relations: Clash or Cooperation?. The research methodology involves data collection through documentation, including various articles and books. Subsequently, content analysis is employed to analyze the descriptive data and scholarly analyses of the premises. The data analysis methods utilized include deductive, inductive, and comparative approaches.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Perceptions of Democracy in Islam
The relationship between Islam and democracy, or in other words, the potential of Islamic democracy as a religion, culture, and civilization, remains a highly controversial issue. In this debate, theory and practice are not always aligned, and neither are religion and political culture: some regard Islam as a doctrine (real Islam), meaning Islam as the Quranic text and/or a broader authoritative tradition, while others look at what is referred to as ‘Islam in history,’ that is Islam as understood and experienced by Muslims. Meanwhile, another group refers to Islamic thought and practice, which introduces Islam as a political program that can compete with secular ideologies, and even surpasses them.

According to John L. Esposito, regarding Western misconceptions in assessing Islam about democracy, intertwined with the view of Islam as a threat, is the belief that Islam is inherently antidemocratic and intolerant, or at best, not friendly to democracy. The lack of enthusiasm or support for political liberalization in the Middle East is rationalized by the claim that Arab and Islamic culture is antidemocratic, and there are concerns that Islamists will use the electoral process to seize power. The democratization movements in the Middle East and the success of Islamist movements in electoral politics raise questions about the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Among the arguments put forward by those concerned about the progress of the democratic process in the Muslim world is that it risks hijacking democracy by Islamist activists and further Islamist attacks on centers of power, threatening Western interests and aiding the development of anti-Westernism and increased instability.

Reinforcing his assumption, according to Fuller, conflicts between religions and their followers are ‘rarely’ based on specific theological differences, but rather on their political and social consequences. In his review of Christian shadows on Modern Islamic Politics, Fuller explains as follows: Therefore, these political and ideological conflicts underline the themes that first emerged in Christianity in its early days. The issues of innovation from that early period almost all reappeared in more drastic forms in the sixteenth century, this time driven by new social and economic factors from the burgeoning urban centers of Europe, namely the growing trade activities, new nationalism, and the political ambitions of rulers and newly emerging nation-states. Islam also struggles with very similar problems, indicating to us the enduring nature of these concerns in all religions. And this struggle occurs at a time when the Islamic world is under strong pressure. Every religion institutionally linked to the state faces the same dilemmas: the relationship between religion and political power, the role of coercion in morality, and the problems of applying moral values in society and governance through political action. However, when religion is freed from the state or official control, it is quickly used as a political tool to oppose the state and demand reform—on behalf of religious values.

The political factor, most acceptable for explaining the emergence of Western stereotypes of Islam, especially regarding the application of the democratic system, is explained by Munoz by stating that
democracy and allegations of its mismatch with the cultures of Islamic countries are issues that often reflect distorted images of Islam in the West. Islam’s unfriendliness towards democracy claimed by Samuel P. Huntington in 1984. In other words, the issue of Islamic democracy has no origin. If we transfer the meaning of submission, as understood in religious terms according to Islam, to the political realm, some conclude that Islam, therefore, accepts despotic power and passive acceptance among believers. The totalitarian nature of belief implies that only a totalitarian state can put dogma into practice and that Islam will encourage the creation of groups that will oppose despotism. From this perspective, we can conclude that in Muslim societies, the state is stronger than its society. Socio-political associations in the Muslim world, with poor organizations and a lack of corporate identity, will be exceptions, and informal groups that will take power, such as these informal groups, are tools for cooperation and supporting the power of elites, whose political relations come from clientelism. While political sociology proposes the idea that a strong civil society is needed for democratization, arguments in this layer are sometimes used to show that Islamic countries do not seem and cannot meet such qualifications.

The research community is divided into analyses of Islam and an emerging trend that supports theories of Islam’s incompatibility with democracy, based on their interpretation of Islamist movements. Although Islamist movements often use language that denies Western democratic values, this denial should be understood from two realities: first, prejudices resulting from the way democracy has been experienced in these countries, and second, the marginalization of the Islamic legacy in debates about democracy and moderation. While this debate acknowledges contributions from the Judeo-Christian tradition, it rejects Islam’s contributions to the field of social and political organization in modern states. The reasons advanced by Mohamed al-Hacmi Hamdi explain this issue; Any objective researcher will acknowledge that the West is still heavily involved in the daily affairs of most Muslim countries, especially in the Arab world. This involvement takes the sad form of an unholy alliance with corrupt, alienated elites who do not respect democracy in any form; instead, the West... here we see the true face of secularism in most Muslim countries: a new form of submission to the same old colonial powers. These powers may have polite democracy spoons, but this is a democracy that only means something to Westerners and does not show moral obligations to other nations.

Controversy over democracy arises from the fact that democracy is understood as a system constructed through experience with ‘the other,’ hence some parts of the world see the West as a model to be emulated, while others reject it on the same basis. This emphasizes the fact that now, based on the experiences of this century, the principle of cultural authenticity is a criterion of substantial credibility for most of the Muslim world. Therefore, no matter how democracy is interpreted with such legitimacy, the understood and experienced values should not be ignored because of the great symbolic value they hold. Differences in theories about the development of Islamic principles such as bay’at, al-ikhātiyār, or shura to form cultural ties between the Islamic heritage and the structure of democracy, as proposed by Tariq al-Bishri, Rashid al-Barawi, Fathi Osman, Rashid al-Ghannushi, Adil Husayn, or Khaled Muhammad Khaled, by placing symbolic goals according to Islam as the primary focus in creating modernity.

Quoting Rami G. Khoury’s opinion (1995), democracy is a process that can be used to translate cultural values into political structures, systems, and goals. Western debates about Arab democratization largely fail to recognize this. Besides, he portrays democracy as a criterion, measure, and goal of Arab political culture based on simplistic and arrogant assumptions that democracy should be an affirmation of Arab values and because democracy is a value that affirms the West.

Perceptions of Jihad in Islam and Terrorism
Al-Dawoody explains that among the many Western misconceptions about Islam, as highlighted by James Turner Johnson, “between the West and Islam, there is no issue that is both divisive and so misunderstood as the issue of jihad.” Fortunately, one of the main reasons for misunderstandings or lack of understanding about jihad among Western scholars has been acknowledged by some of them. He further illustrates: While there have been few “early studies” and many topics related to the study
of this complex issue have yet to be explored in Western academic research, jihad is generally depicted in Western literature as a holy war to Islamize non-Muslims. For centuries, the image of Islam in Europe has been associated with its spectacular spread and territorial expansion. Christian Europe was deeply concerned about this phenomenon, especially after Spain was conquered and remained under Muslim rule for eight centuries. Moreover, there is a tendency in the West to understand Islam as a religion inherently laden with violence. Richard C. Martin asserts that modern media and many Western entities attempting to depict Islam and Arabs conclude that there is a "clear ethos of violence in Islamic society" and are aware of it. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad states: "Associating Islam with holy war, and Muslims with the spread of violence, seems to be endemic in the Western consciousness about the religion of Islam. This is very disturbing to Muslims”.

Furthermore, in 1993, Samuel P. Huntington hypothesized in "The Clash of Civilizations?" that the "primary focus of future conflicts that will soon occur is between the West and some Islamic-Confucian states.” In fact, analysts have limited this conflict to one between "Islam" and the "West," completely disregarding the involvement of "Confucian" states in the anticipated conflict. Additionally, several years after Huntington presented his theory, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the bombings in London and Madrid, suicide bombings, hostage-taking, and beheadings in certain Muslim countries under occupation brought a new dimension to the association of Islam with violence in Western literature. In most literature after 9/11, the term "jihad" has been used in terms of terrorism. In other words, Western lines of thought are more inclined to associate the causes of terrorist acts with Islamic religious extremism, particularly with jihad, rather than with specific regional conflicts and the occupation of certain Muslim countries, as stated by the terrorists themselves.

The concept of jihad has now reached a perfect symbiosis with Western interference in politics: they both have created a mutual desire for two-way warfare that reinforces each other, a kind of interdependence of violence, each justifying the other. Moreover, the study of jihad has become a cottage industry in the United States, mostly dominated by committed supporters on both sides, who fiercely debate the nature of the problem. Most of these studies seek to find faults in Middle Eastern and Muslim cultures, and Islam itself, to justify war; the teachings of jihad are considered the main source of "problems," not symptoms or expressions.

According to Al-Dawoody, the reading of outsiders—Westerners—on jihad often restricts Islam's teachings on war, as presented in Western literature, to phrases in the Quran urging Muslims to kill polytheists wherever they find them, without studying the context or interpretation of these expressions, even within their locus or in conjunction with other Quranic verses regarding peace and war. This approach has a line of thought that associates Israel's cruelty towards the Palestinian people with Jewish religious teachings or at least with Jewish extremism. Moreover, modern Western literature is still influenced by the old Western school of thought that depicts Islam, as Rudolph Peters puts it, as "teaching violence and fanaticism, spread by wild knights, carrying the Quran in one hand and a sword in the other.

Generally, there are three contradictory motives for jihad presented in "outsider" literature. First, jihad is generally presented in Western literature as "similar to the Christian concept of the Crusades and thus always referred to as a 'holy war' against non-Muslims." This presentation and translation of jihad are based on one understanding of the goal of jihad, expressed by Khadduri as the "universalism of the religion [Islam] and the formation of a world-dominating state." In other words, quoting the Quran (Quran 2:191), US Navy Major John F. Whalen states that "the highest duty of Islam, therefore, is to defeat those who disbelieve [in Islam]." Second, and contrary to the first, Watt argues that "most members of the [early Islamic jihad] expeditions may not have thought of anything other than wealth... There was no thought of spreading Islam." Similarly, Edward J. Jurji argues that the motivation for Arab conquests was clearly not "for Islamic proselytizing... Military gain, economic desire, [and] efforts to strengthen state control and increase its sovereignty... are some determining factors." In his book "Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries," Paul Fregosi alleges that "even more than Allah, the main motive for war that inspired the Arabs was plunder, slaves, women, and the desire to fight to the death for Islam.” Fregosi concludes by emphasizing its bizarre claim that
the pursuit of carnal desires "helped them [Muslims] to conquer half the known world in less than a hundred years." Third, in 1977 Peters concluded that the "main goal of jihad is not as often assumed in older European literature, namely to forcibly Islamize the infidels, but rather the expansion—and also the defense—of the Islamic state." He revealed that the translation of jihad as "holy war," therefore, is "clearly mistaken.

In his book "Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7 to the 21 Centuries," Paul Fregosi accuses that the primary motivation for Arab warfare is plunder, slavery, rape, and the desire to fight to the death for Islam, even more so than the command of Allah. Fregosi concludes by claiming that this pursuit of worldly desires aided Muslims in conquering half the known world in less than a hundred years. This reflects a highly biased view and is often disputed by historians who argue that the expansion of Islam was driven by far more complex political, economic, and social factors than Fregosi's oversimplified claims.

The issue of terrorism carried out by some Muslims, both domestically and internationally, and its relation to Islamic teachings, particularly jihad, is a highly contentious issue. The implications of this issue are not merely academic or polemical but also encompass political, military, intelligence, and security dimensions. This explains why Western politicians, military officers, intelligence agencies, institutions, and journalists are engaged in discussions about the relationship between Islamic religious teachings and terrorist acts.

Most discussions about terrorism in the West tend to associate the causes of terrorist actions with "Islamic extremism" rather than factors such as regional conflicts and the occupation of certain Muslim countries, as articulated by the terrorists themselves. For instance, Melvin E. Lee, a captain and nuclear engineer in the U.S. Navy, states that "Islamic terrorism," targeting the United States, is not motivated by U.S. policies but by Islam itself, particularly jihad. Therefore, he suggests that "only fundamental reform of Islam will resolve the conflict."

However, Fuller offers a slightly different perspective on understanding terrorism in Islam. While his view tends to be more sympathetic, not in the context of defending Islam but in understanding that the problem is not fundamentally with "Islam" but rather with the legacy of geopolitical and social issues affecting Muslim communities, which are forced to resort to the weapons of the weak. He suggests that terrorist operations do not only occur in the context of Islam but also in the context of separatist, extremist, and revolutionary movements in various parts of the world. Thus, it is important to understand that the issue of terrorism and jihad in Islam is a complex topic involving political, economic, social, and religious factors. Overly simplistic or biased explanations, such as those put forth by some authors, can lead to inaccurate understandings of these phenomena.

Factors of Migration and Conversion
John L. Esposito (2010) in his book "The Future of Islam" discusses Europe's fear of a new style of Islam invasion today, which will no longer attack physically like the failed assaults of Islamic forces from Spain and successfully thwarted by Charles Martel at the border of France, Poitiers in 732, and the Turkish siege of Vienna failed in 1529 and 1683, but rather sees the specter of Islam in another form which he calls "soft terrorism" or "soft terrorism." Furthermore, Markus explains that the flooding of Muslim populations through migration processes, both due to the revolutions that developed in the Arab countries in early 2011 often referred to as "the Arab spring," and through normal migration to seek job opportunities, is feared to eventually, borrowing John L. Esposito's term, make Europe dominated by Muslim or Arab populations, so that someday the name Europa might not be impossible to be twisted into EUROBIA.

Specifically, Fuller (2010) makes a statement in his book "What If the World Without Islam: An Alternative Historical Narrative" in Chapter 9: "Muslims in the West: Loyal Citizens or Fifth Column?" Fuller's choice of words is full of suspicion — vigilance — which is a characteristic of intelligence instincts. According to him, whether Muslims in the West are now enemies in disguise, a fifth column waiting for a signal to attack? Open expressions of intense anti-Islam sentiment by Europeans and Americans are now more accepted in a society driven by burning concerns about security. He notes
that Bernard Lewis, a renowned neoconservative expert on Islam, evokes the specter of demographic trends in Europe now that could eventually produce a Muslim Europe. However, the actual figures do not match. Other right-wing comments dread a future “Eurabia.”

Markus explains that there are three challenges of Islam to Christian Europe, quoting David Pawson's opinion in his book "The Challenge of Islam to Christians" (London, 2003), that there are three waves of Islamic attacks on Europe. The first is military attacks, the second is cultural mental attacks, and the third is the migration of Muslim populations to Europe, or what John L. Esposito calls “soft terrorism.” Included in this third wave category is also conversion, namely the increasing number of European residents embracing Islam. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), there were 102,387 migrants as of July 3, 2017, the majority of whom were scattered in Italy by 85,183, in Spain by 6,464, in Greece by 10,094, and in Cyprus by 273. According to the Thompson Reuters Foundation, in the past four years, over 500,000 or half a million migrants have crossed from Libya to Italy.

Migration has become one of the factors exacerbating conflict and tension between Islam and the West, as Munoz (2010) views it. He explains that since the late 1980s, the Eastern enemy has gradually collapsed, a mix of spreading issues, poorly delivered and inadequately covered media reports (such as the Rushdie affair, the Gulf War, the headscarf issue in France, or escalating violence in Algeria) are the only realities depicted for Western public opinion. Western public opinion tends to assimilate anything that comes from the various Muslim worlds through a conception of Islam as total and essential, thus, the Eastern image is determined by its religious identity. The Muslim world is seen as deeply rooted in the Middle Ages, and Muslims are presumed to be fundamentalist militants in an international conspiracy against a widening Western identity, unstoppable through Western society. The cases discussed are the transformation of the ways in which immigrants from Arab and Turkish countries in Europe have socially experienced over the past few decades. They have gone from being workers, foreigners, and those who have become practicing Muslims implanted in Europe. This is solely interpreted as ‘Muslim visibility’, a sign of religious backwardness and a threat to secularism. This attitude prevents a true understanding of the phenomenon of immigrant re-Islamization in accurate explanations of their own social and cultural characteristics, especially their relationship with the countries they transit. It also blinds us to the fact that it is very possible for immigrants to live and experience their Muslim beliefs in modern ways.

John L. Esposito has also endorsed the thesis of Bat Ye’or, a British-born historian of Egyptian origin, about Eurabia: The Europe-Arab Axis published in 2005, and even referred to the systematic migration of Islamic adherents to Europe as "soft terrorism". Predictions of the destruction of modern Europe have obscured the fact that Europe will be flooded with Islam and transformed into “Eurabia” by the end of this century. The mass media, political leaders, and right-wing observers warn of the threat of "soft terrorism" to take over America and Europe. Bernard Lewis, a Middle East historian and advisor to the failed George W. Bush administration on its Iraq policy, received widespread coverage when he berated Europeans for losing their loyalty, confidence, and respect for their own culture. Lewis further accused them of having "submitted" to Islam in a state of "self-degradation," "political correctness," and "multiculturalism."

For some in the West, the nature of the Islamic threat is explained by political and demographic relationships. Many researchers in the past who expressed polemics and stereotypes of Arabs, Turks, or Muslims, not outlining specific causes of conflict and confrontation, are now witnessing the creation of a new myth. The coming confrontation between Islam and the West is said to be part of a historical pattern of warlike and aggressive Muslims now seen as a potential domestic threat, increasing the importance of the presence and growth of Muslim communities. Furthermore, Esposito explains that the presence of Muslims in Europe and North America poses a challenge, though not in the sense predicted. First and foremost is the challenge of distinguishing between its Muslim majority population and the minority of violent revolutionaries. Second is the challenge of assimilation and full integration.
The concept of civilizations in conflict emerged after the Cold War, through the thesis of 'clash of civilizations,' first proposed by American Political Scientist Samuel P. Huntington in his lecture at The American Enterprise Institute in 1992, introducing his theory of clash of civilizations. He suggested that the fundamental source of future conflicts would not be ideological or economic but cultural. Post-Cold War conflicts would not be between nations but between civilizations, with extreme Islam posing the greatest threat to world peace. Huntington's views were later published in the Foreign Affairs Journal in 1993 before being officially published in 1996. In the journal, the hypothesis of the Clash of Civilizations was explained as follows: “It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in the future will not be ideological or economic but cultural. The division between human groups and future conflict sources will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the primary actors in global issues, but the main conflict in global politics will occur between nations and groups with different civilizations. Conflict between civilizations will dominate global politics in the future. The cultural and religious identities of the world’s population will be the primary triggers of conflict in the post-Cold War era. American Political Scientist Samuel P. Huntington emphasized that the wars to come would not be between nations but between civilizations, and that extreme Islam would pose the greatest threat to world peace”.

However, the explanation of increasingly prevalent and seemingly unstoppable conflicts between civilizations has been met with harsh criticism. For example, Huntington's view of civilizations as 'tectonic plates' portrays civilizations as far more homogenous and distinct from one another than they actually are. In practice, civilizations always overlap and influence each other, giving rise to hybrid or blurred cultural identities. There is, for example, ample evidence of dialogue and overlap between Islamic and Western civilizations, as well as evidence of competition or discord between them. Additionally, Huntington made the error referred to as 'culturalism' by portraying culture as the universal foundation for personal and social identity, thus failing to explore the extent to which cultural identities are shaped by political, economic, and other situations. Thus, what appears to be cultural conflict may have very different and far more complex explanations.

In addition to these points, Huntington's thesis has been criticized and opposed by various scholars, including English historian Arnold Toynbee, who asserted that the life of civilizations is a dynamic process of continuous development and mutual influence, as evidenced in his book A Study of History. Toynbee argued that of the 21 great civilizations that have existed in the world, only six remain today. This view is supported by Edward W. Said, an orientalist observer from Egypt, who specifically responded to Huntington's thesis by emphasizing that Huntington's assumption of rigid categorization of civilizations overlooks the existence of dynamic interdependence and interaction among world civilizations. Civilizations are not closed boxes. History clearly demonstrates the dynamics of interaction, exchange, and borrowing among civilizations. Thus, Huntington's paradigm does not help understand the existing reality, although it can provide a concrete and practical perspective. Additionally, Huntington's perspective disproportionately focuses on Islam, heavily influenced by long-standing memories of Muslim-European conflicts, particularly the clash of Abrahamic religions. According to him, the clash of civilizations is nothing more than a new language to express the selection of history, not to understand the ongoing interdependence.

Amartya Sen responded to Huntington's thesis by stating that diversity is a reality in all world cultures, including the Western world. Without exception, the Western world also has diverse practices. The democratic practices that have excelled in the modern Western world are generally the result of consensus since the Enlightenment and the industrial revolution, especially in recent centuries. Understanding the historical commitment of the Western world over the past millennium to democracy, and then contrasting it with traditions outside the Western world (by treating them monolithically) is a serious mistake.

Mohammed Abed al-Jabri proposed his concept of "ideological clash." He wrote that the clash between civilizations is not between Jesus Christ, Confucius, or Prophet Muhammad, but rather due to the unfair distribution of power, wealth, and world influence and the lack of respect for the historical understanding given to small states by larger states. Culture is a vehicle for expressing conflict, not its cause. This view is echoed by Graham E. Fuller in an article published two years after Huntington's
article. However, we must not delude ourselves. It is not the right to express the ‘logic of war’ that supports this thesis that we are analyzing. Not an ‘enemy’ that seems to be given another name.

Graham E. Fuller, in his book “What If There Were No Islam: An Alternative History Narrative,” states in his introduction: Try to imagine a world without Islam. It seems almost impossible, as images and references to Islam dominate news headlines, radio waves, computer screens, and our political debates. We are inundated with terms such as jihad, fatwa, madrasa, Taliban, Wahhabi, mullah, martyr, mujahidin, radical Islamic groups, and Sharia laws. Islam appears to be central in America’s efforts against terrorism and its long-term commitment to wage various wars abroad under the “Global War on Terrorism.” Furthermore, he explains that Islam seems to offer some kind of instant and easy analytical yardstick for most problems in the Middle East, and it is with this yardstick that people understand today’s tumultuous world. By pointing to Islam, we can simplify everything into a polarized struggle between “Western values” and the “Islamic world.” For some neoconservatives, indeed, “Islamic fascism” is the archenemy in World War IV or the “Long War” — a great ideological struggle that is simply viewed as centered on religion and seems to overlook the thousands of other factors that have contributed to the long-standing East-West confrontation.

Fuller further explains that there are strong reasons to suspect deep-rooted geopolitical tensions between the Middle East and the West that have long persisted throughout history, before Islam, even before Christianity. Many other factors have strongly influenced the evolution of East-West relations over a very long period: economic interests, geopolitical interests, power struggles between regional empires, conflicts between nations, nationalism, and even fierce disputes within Christianity itself. All of these provide the basis for East-West rivalries and conflicts that are actually little related, if at all, to Islam. This is the rationale behind the writing of the book, which examines the polarized struggle between Western values and the Islamic world from the opposite direction.

According to Fuller, his book is not intended to downplay the role of Islam in world history. He even mentions that Islam has had a significant impact on the world, as one of the greatest and most powerful civilizations, and has been continuous throughout history. No other civilization has lasted as long over such a vast area as Islam. He greatly appreciates Islamic culture, its art, sciences, philosophy, and civilization, as well as Muslims as people. According to him, the world would be a poorer place without Islamic civilization. Based on this, Fuller asserts that the current crisis in East-West relations, or between the West and Islam, is indeed minimally related to religion and closely tied to cultural and political tensions, interests, rivalries, and disputes. This conclusion is significant: it is closely related to how we ultimately address the current confrontation between the West and Islam. Are we heading towards a massive and inevitable clash of civilizations, a Hundred Years’ War or World War IV, as some have felt? A small group of Muslims, Christians, and Jews truly enjoys such a simplistic existential struggle narrative. However, if we conclude that religion is not the primary issue in the current tensions, then we have a much better chance of addressing or even resolving these issues, no matter how complex they may be. In that sense, hopefully, we can build a strong foundation for the three great Abrahamic religions — Judaism, Christianity, and Islam — that have more similarities than they debate. It is the nations that should debate.

According to Munoz, the current theory of clash of civilizations is caused by misunderstanding. This theory interprets history based on confrontation and an ethnocentric conception of mutual respect among different cultures, as it assumes that this mutual respect depends largely on other civilizations on earth that are capable of interacting. Furthermore, it overlooks conflicts caused by disruption due to the marginalization of established cultural codes in non-Western societies. A related case is the drastic clash of cultures caused by European colonization, the influences of which are still felt today. The question that arises is, why Islam? And why has the Islam-West dichotomy been continuously emphasized in recent years? Although a biased explanation of international events, such as the Gulf War, or regional events, such as confrontations between Arabs and Islamic regimes, undoubtedly reinforced such perceptions, the dichotomy that many people give between Islam and the West is primarily based on the mistaken perceptions traditionally conveyed about different societies, as a result of misinterpretations of history.
Far from explaining the differences between various parties using conflict of interest principles and analyzing cultural relationships through inter-civilizational interpretations, as summarized by the Moroccan intellectual in this book, the dominant historical interpretation of Islam-West relations has been focused on the principle of ideological antagonism (Byzantium against the Islamic Empire, Christian Kingdom against Andalusia, Ottoman Turkey against Europe, Arab-Islamic nationalism against the West). Furthermore, Munoz explains that this problem stems from the fact that the history of Eastern societies is usually explained according to Islamic determinism arising solely from the fact of being Muslim. Collective and individual behavioral patterns among societies in Islamic countries are explained from the perspective of an abstract Islamic idea, rather than interpreted from a standpoint considering geography and local history, social structures, and human experiences. All of this gives rise to a view of the Muslim world as static.

In his view, such ambivalence is caused by Europe, along with colonial ethnocentrism that justifies such domination and contempt for the non-European world, resulting in the loss of historical and cultural dignity, causing serious confusion and frustration among Muslim populations. From their perspective, a corpus of legislation compiled over 13 centuries is rejected on the grounds of the arrival of modernity with European domination, which weakens the assertion of their own culture. Reassertion of cultural identity and reality is one of the key issues for Islamic movements today. Consequently, just as Islam’s perception in the European imagination, in the Muslim world there is a distorted image of the atheistic, materialistic, and imperialist West, which in turn is resented. Both impressions are the result of ideological stagnation caused by the dialectic between European ethnocentrism and the culture of resentment created among colonized societies.

Heywood offers a more subtle critique of Samuel P. Huntington’s thesis on clash of civilizations, suggesting that conflicts between various civilizations may be more of an expression of real economic and political injustices than cultural alienation. The emergence of militant Islamism may thus be better explained by tensions and crises in the Middle East in general and the Arab world in particular, related to colonial legacies, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the survival of unpopular but often oil-rich autocratic regimes, and high levels of poverty and unemployment in major cities, rather than a cultural mismatch between Western and Islamic value systems.

**CONCLUSION**

Several important considerations serve as a generic recipe to address the ‘wounds’ resulting from conflicts between Islam and the West. Fuller outlines detailed steps as follows: Firstly, Western military and political intervention in the Islamic world — highly provocative to Muslims — must cease to allow the region to begin to calm. Secondly, efforts to identify and thwart terrorist actions should be pursued through intelligence and policing. Thirdly, the United States should withdraw its support for pro-American dictators as it discredits the U.S., renders its commitment to democracy seen as false, and fosters an environment prone to explosion and increased hatred towards America. Fourthly, democratization should be allowed to grow in the Islamic world, but Washington should not be the vehicle for its implementation. Fifthly, the U.S. must accept that in the democratic process, Islamic parties will be legally elected in early elections in most Muslim countries. Sixthly, early resolution of the Palestinian issue should be pursued. Seventhly, if even one-tenth of the possibly over one trillion dollars spent by Washington on Middle East wars, which have spread death and destruction with little result, could be used to build schools, universities, hospitals, clinics, and training institutions, the region would change. America’s image would soar, and significant progress would be made in regional living standards. Eighthly, progressive U.S. policies can promptly end sources of international and transnational violence and radicalism. Ninthly, ultimately, only locals will be able to find solutions to address Islamic radicalism, meaning it is a local issue. In closing, it is worth considering what Azra conveyed, citing the "Message from Qatar" as follows: Firstly, the categorization of the 'Muslim World' and the 'West' in opposing binary positions is no longer acceptable. Secondly, based on annual research and surveys conducted by the Pew Research Institute and Gallup, overall tensions and conflicts between Western governments and societies with Muslim countries and societies show a continuing
downward trend. Thirdly, Muslim societies are increasingly accepting of democratic political systems, often associated with the Western world. Fourthly, over the past 10 years, many Muslim countries and societies have experienced economic and welfare improvements.

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